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The Civil War’s unique circumstances granted President Abraham Lincoln unprecedented 
powers when it came to persecuting the war; however, these increased powers for the president 
came at the expense of Americans’ civil liberties. During the war, those who criticized the 
government could be tried for treason, and those accused of this crime were not tried in civilian 
courts, but in military tribunals. 
 
This paper will focus on how these unchecked powers led to a situation where minority factions 
like the Copperheads could be tried not out of military necessity, but for political expedience. In 
looking at the cases brought against notable Copperheads Clement Vallandigham and Lambdin 
Milligan, it becomes apparent these men and their actions posed little threat to the war’s 
prosecution. This unfortunate forfeiture of civil liberties sets a poor precedent for maintaining 
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I.  Introduction  
In the summer leading up to the presidential election in 1864, President Lincoln confided 
his fears to Republican Senator Charles Sumner, and stated he feared the “fire in the rear more so 
than [the Union’s] military chances” in the field. The fire in the rear Lincoln was fearful of was a 
North West secession conspiracy and his own reelection prospects in November. For the past 
year and a half, the Lincoln administration had been receiving intelligence reports detailing how 
secret Copperhead organizations were starting riots and planning to free Confederate prisoners of 
war and lead the North West to secede from the Union. Additionally, former Union Army of the 
Potomac General George B. McClellan, who was still popular among the public and army, had 
signed on to head the Democratic presidential ticket. The summer of 1864 had seen the war’s 
highest causalities, and the nation was suffering from war weariness—many Americans wanted 
the war to end, and the Democratic ticket was a ticket of peace. With conspiracies circulating 
throughout the North and his reelection hopes taking a hit every day the casualty report was 
printed, Lincoln was right to fear this fire in the rear more so than General Robert E. Lee’s army; 
however, the reports detailing Copperhead secret societies and draft riots were largely 
overblown.  
Lincoln combatted this perceived fire in the rear by implementing many unprecedented 
executive measures during the war. He suspended habeas corpus, imposed martial law outside 
the immediate zone of military conflict, and tried dissenters for treason. Lincoln claimed he was 
entitled to such authority by the war powers clause within the Constitution. The Constitution 
offered the President more power during times of insurrection, and Lincoln defended his use of 
power by citing that his actions were necessary for the war effort. Under closer examination, 




tribunals, set up to try civilians with treason, were more a means for political expedience than 
military necessity. Two trials from the Civil War make this clear: the trials of Congressman 
Clement L. Vallandigham and Lambdin P. Milligan. Vallandigham was tried for speaking out 
against the draft, and Milligan was arrested for his alleged association in a plot to free 
Confederate prisoners of war. This paper will argue executive authority during the Civil War 
operated outside the responsibilities granted to it in the Constitution. With the Supreme Court 
unable to lawfully review any military commissions during the "temper of the times," the 
President was left unchecked to illegally suspend civil liberties and try dissenters and political 
opponents for treason. The Lincoln Administration’s example sets a poor precedent for securing 
American civil liberties during wartime. 
Before considering the cases brought against both Vallandigham and Milligan, this paper 
will describe who these Copperheads really were during the Civil War. Three different theses 
will be discussed, and each provides an explanation for why Copperhead opposition to the war 
was so widespread in certain areas. However, there is a fourth theory that I will propose: fear of 
government overreach united these people in the North. Before the war, most rural Americans 
only interacted with the federal government when they received mail from the post office and 
voted in elections. The draft and military provost marshals who supervised it became the first 
large-scale domestic intelligence agency in the United States, and had unprecedented power to 
directly intrude on people’s personal lives. This fear of a growing centralized authority 
exercising unchecked power throughout the war’s course caused many Americans to band 
together to defend their rights. The Hoskinsville Rebellion is a great example of Americans 
doing just this. Copperheads like Vallandigham spoke for these people in particular, and 




 Congressman Clement Vallandigham would eventually be arrested for criticizing the 
draft and General Burnside’s General Order 38, which essentially imposed martial law over 
Ohio’s inhabitants. Vallandigham was tried for treason under a military tribunal, and this trial 
was later declared unconstitutional because Vallandigham was a civilian tried by the military. 
Vallandigham’s case also highlights how the definition of treason changed during the Civil War, 
and, in many cases, changed in order for dissenters like Vallandigham to be tried. Vallandigham 
did not actively encourage draft resistance; instead, he was encouraging people to vote for the 
Democratic ticket if they already opposed the draft. The draft was unprecedented and unpopular; 
criticizing it should not be grounds for arrest. Furthermore, the draft resistance was born from 
racial, cultural, and economic reasons. Vallandigham did not make the draft unpopular; he 
simply used its unpopularity to his advantage. 
Lambdin P. Milligan’s trial is another example of how Lincoln’s measures set a bad 
precedent for civil liberties during wartime. Milligan was a member of a secret society, the Sons 
of Liberty, whose leader concocted a plan to free Confederate prisoners of war; yet, the plan 
never went in to affect. The society’s leader mentioned the plan to others in the group, but was 
quickly shut down and cooler heads prevailed. The damage was done, though, and Indiana 
Governor Oliver P. Morton had all the men arrested when he caught wind of the plot from a 
double agent within the secret society. Though no plan ever went in to affect, the conspirators 
were charged with treason. The Supreme Court overruled these charges following the war 
because martial law should only be confined within the scope of immediate military conflict. 
Under a closer investigation, it appears these secret societies posed little threat to the war effort.  
The Drueker v. Salomon case is also important to consider because this case serves as an 




and encouraged others to loot and burn down properties. This action was truly detrimental to the 
war effort and worthy of being tried as treason against the United States, but how does 
Vallandigham’s speech merit the same charge? The differences in these two cases emphasize 
how treason’s definition changed during the course of the war—civilians could now be tried for 
Constructive Treason, or advocating treasonous activities without actually committing them 
themselves.1 The military tribunals that tried Vallandigham and Milligan cannot be supported by 
claims of military necessity because these two individuals posed no threat to the war effort. 
Instead, there was a political reason for trying these men. 
By analyzing how Governor Morton and the military used these secret societies to 
portray Democrats in a poor light, it becomes apparent charging political opponents with treason 
was a viable tactic for Republicans during the war. General Carrington’s reports on the Knights 
of the Golden Compass’ activities reveal the true conspiracy in the North West was the 
fabrication of these secret societies between the military and state government. Carrington 
reported that low draft numbers and riots were all caused by this society that never even 
existed—it was a roaming charlatan’s Ponzi scheme from before the war. Also, reported secret 
society activity, interestingly enough, coincided with Indiana’s state elections. Furthermore, 
many of those tried alongside Milligan were prominent Indiana Democrats. If there was no real 
necessity for trying these individuals, how was the Lincoln Administration able to continually 
ignore long held American civil liberties for political expedience? 
The answer lies in the fact the Civil War’s unique circumstances allowed for treason’s 
definition to expand and led to a situation where the executive branch had no feasible check to its 
authority. By following the growth of Lincoln’s executive powers throughout the war, it 
																																																								




becomes apparent the only check to Lincoln’s power was the Supreme Court, who declined to 
rule on necessity until after the war. In other words, one man’s definition of necessity could take 
away the rights of millions of Americans, even if it was unconstitutional.  
This paper’s arguments and topics are relevant within the Civil War’s current 
historiography because the paper focuses on a minority faction and is geographically interested 
in mainly the North West. Most Civil War studies focus on the war’s military and social aspects, 
namely emancipation, and are geographically interested in mainly the eastern seaboard. Within 
the current discourse on the Copperheads, this paper is also relevant. Copperhead historians 
usually disagree on whether the Copperheads posed a significant threat to Lincoln’s War effort, 
and this investigation supports historian Frank Klement’s estimation that they their perceived 
threat was no more than a paper tiger.2 However, most Copperhead studies do not include any 
legal investigation as to how these trials came to be, and fewer consider this minority group 
within the greater scope of Lincoln’s executive measures during the war. For these reasons, this 
paper is a worthwhile contribution to the existing Civil War and Copperhead literature. 
In short, this investigation is centered on answering who these Copperheads were, were 
they truly a threat, and how these unconstitutional actions were allowed to happen. After all of 
these considerations, it appears Vallandigham and Milligan’s arrests were not necessary. Instead 
they were unconstitutional and politically expedient. This sets a poor precedent for American 
civil liberties in present wars, because the questions surrounding whether the court should 
directly intervene have never been answered. Today, with the United States engaged in conflicts 
with non-state actors, the delineation between what is within the scope of military conflict and 
what is not is made even blurrier. With this in mind, the unconstitutional military tribunals that 
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tried both Vallandigham and Milligan should stand as a reminder for how quickly civil liberties 

























II. Who Were the Copperheads? 
This investigation will focus on a minority political faction in the North: the 
Copperheads. The term Copperhead was a pejorative term for any Democrat seeking an end to 
hostilities and recognition of the Southern states. The term’s origin comes from Republicans 
likening these Peace Democrats to the poisonous copperhead snake; however, these Peace 
Democrats liked the name Copperheads and, in response, wore copper pennies on their jackets.3   
Democrats, specifically Peace Democrats, were united in partisan opposition to the draft, 
emancipation, and Lincoln’s military courts. These opponents of the war came in many shapes 
and sizes, and ranged from southern born farmers in southern Indiana to German and Irish 
Catholic immigrants in New York City. Three theories will be discussed on why Copperheads 
opposed the war, but a fourth theory, that they were all fearful of an unchecked and expanding 
central government, seems more appropriate in describing every Copperhead in the North. 
Fearful their country was irrevocably changing, their slogan was “the Constitution as it is, the 
Union as it was.”4 
Historians explaining how there was such large support for the Democratic party in parts 
of the North often cite three possible reasons: the migration thesis, socio-economic thesis, and 
racial thesis. Illinois historian Viktor Hicken posits migration from the South before the Civil 
War led to the large number in the North West who rejected Lincoln’s emancipation policy. 
Historian Frank L. Klement, possibly the leading historian on all things Copperheads, claims 
socio-economic factors united rural farmers and blue-collar workers against the Lincoln 
administration. The third and final explanation for significant Copperhead support throughout the 
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North is the racial element. Historian Jennifer Weber points to emancipation being the straw that 
broke the camel’s back for many Democrats who were on the fence on denouncing the war. 
These Copperheads believed the war’s aims had shifted, and that the war had gone from 
preserving the Union to freeing the blacks. An analysis of these three theories reveals each to be 
inadequate in some form or the other on describing why all Copperheads from across the North 
opposed the war. If demographics, socio-economics and race all fail to account for why all 
Copperheads opposed the Lincoln administration, perhaps the one strain united them all: a fear 
of the central government’s unprecedented authority during the war.  
When the war began, there was initially little resistance from the Copperheads in the 
North. The rage militaire spread across the North as the nation prepared for the Civil War to 
come, and support for the war at this point was largely bipartisan. The North’s most influential 
Democrat, Abraham Lincoln’s former political adversary, Senator Stephen A. Douglas decreed, 
“There can be but two parties, the party of patriots and the party of traitors. We [Democrats] 
belong to the former.”5 However, Democratic support for the war had one caveat: the war’s only 
aim should be to reunify the country. Any other stipulations, namely emancipation, were not 
what this war was being fought over. While it would seem like political suicide to denounce the 
war before any significant battle was fought, the first outspoken Copperheads began to rear their 
heads at the war’s outbreak. Those who decried at the war at this point can be imagined as the 
first wave of Copperheads. Vallandigham agreed with secession’s legality and fellow hardliner 
New York City Mayor Fernando Wood put forth a motion for New York City to secede from 
New York State.6 Supporting his move to secede from the Abolitionists in Albany, Wood stated, 
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“It behooves every distinct community, as well as every individual, to take care of them selves.”7 
His movement inspired by overt sectionalism failed, but Wood’s reasoning encapsulates how the 
Copperhead faction formed in the war’s early stages. Copperheads were not just farmers from 
the Mid West, and the Copperhead rhetoric appealed to many other distinct communities in the 
North as well. 
 The first theory that fails to account for all Copperheads is the migration thesis, which 
centers around a distinct community called the Butternuts. They were pejoratively called 
Butternuts because their clothes were dyed in natural beiges as was customary in the South.8 
These Butternuts were people born in the South who moved to the Mid West. They mainly 
populated Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois’ southern frontiers and were agrarian. In analyzing the 1860 
United States Census, historian Jennifer L. Weber contends that in Indiana and Illinois, ten to 
twelve percent of the population were born in the South. With six percent and eight percent of 
the populations in Ohio and Indiana, respectively, being born in the South as well, a considerable 
portion of the Mid-West’s population was sympathetic to the South, and, likewise, the Peace 
Democrats.9 The area was called Western Egypt because of its black soil and countless fields; 
this agrarian region would experience the most violent anti-war protests and use of military 
force. The migration thesis is centered on these Butternuts, and contends that when southerners 
moved to the North West before the war, they brought their conservative political beliefs and 
pro-slavery temperament along for the ride.  The southern parts of these states were “settled by 
immigrants who streamed northward out of the Carolinas, Tennessee, and Kentucky… [and] 
their reaction to the [emancipation] proclamation was, in many cases, positively explosive.”10 
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8 Weber, Copperheads, 17. 
9 Weber, Copperheads, 18.	




Southern roots probably played a role in Butternuts denouncing the war, but their loyalty to the 
South did not drastically affect their participation in the war. Political allegiance did not affect 
participation in the Union war effort. Democratic leaning Massac County “enlisted five-sixths of 
its entire voting population”11 in to the Union Army. Southern heritage alone did cause these 
people to become Copperheads. 
Historians Richard O. Curry and Eugene H. Roseboom dispute Hicken’s migration thesis 
and instead consider citing southern origins as a major factor in determining Copperhead support 
a “generalization that [does] not seem to withstand the challenge of critical revisionism.”12 Curry 
argues support for the Copperheads was found in counties that had historically voted Democrat 
in the past. Massac County, which had the largest percentage of Southern migrants in Southern 
Illinois, fell from voting Democrat at an eighty-one percent clip to a measly twenty-two percent 
clip by the war’s end.13 While changes in the war’s outlooks played a part in the decline, a nearly 
sixty point drop in votes shows Southern heritage alone did not factor in to the Copperhead 
support in the North.  
Another explanation for the ardent Copperhead support in North can be the socio-
economic realities war caused in the North West. This second thesis is proposed by historian 
Frank L. Klement, and suggests that areas of poor soil fertility (the black soil that gave Western 
Egypt its name) and the loss of southern markets caused an agrarian radicalism that precipitated 
the Copperhead movement. Under this theory, severing the region’s economic ties to the South 
was the leading determinant for Copperhead affiliation. Klement supports this argument by 
stating, “hundreds of commercial houses had a vested interest in the Mississippi River trade. 
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Southern bonds underwrote some of the paper money circulating in the upper Middle West. A 
portion of the farm surplus of Ohio moved southward, either to a consumers’ market or to the 
New Orleans outlet. A dozen Cincinnati industries depended on, in large measure, Southern 
buyers.”14 These economic facts were true, but only at the war’s outbreak. Democrats seized on 
this initial economic depression and raised old fears that the war would turn North Westerners in 
to “slaves and serfs of New England”15 and that New England’s “hoops of steel”16 would encircle 
and choke the North West’s economy.  The Democrats were placating fears that were not 
without basis. North Western ties to New England were already growing because railroad 
expansion had linked the North West to the Atlantic markets in 1850’s.17 Democrats were 
stoking fear this inevitable industrialization would place industrial and moneyed interests above 
the interests of Mid Western farmers. 18 Under closer examination, these socio-economic realities 
have been overblown. 
 Klement cites Cincinnati as a prime example of socio-economics fostering Copperhead 
support. Cincinnati is an interesting case study for evaluating how the war directly affected the 
North West economy because it was linked to both New Orleans and New York in 1860. The 
war’s first year did see economic downturn for Cincinnati because 77% of ale, 63% of whiskey, 
71% of candles, 85% of furniture, and 60% of sundry merchandise were all sent south.19 The 
Union blockade caused “the bankruptcy of those commercial houses which specialized in the 
southern trade.”20 However, Klement has overlooked that Cincinnati’s trade with New Orleans 
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16 New York Tribune 14 April 1861. 
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18 Weber, Copperheads, 28. 
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was not access to Southern markets, but for foreign export to the Gulf of Mexico.21  These 
products could still reach their Latin American markets, albeit, with a significant upcharge 
through New York City. While the New Orleans blockade caused some commercial houses to 
flounder, historian Charles R. Wilson contends the loss of southern trade was actually menial to 
Cincinnati’s economic woes. In fact, he claims “by the hogshead the South took 42% of the 
shipments, by the pound it took 40%, by the box it took only 1.7%.”22 The box Wilson is 
referring to the dollar amount southern shipping counted toward Cincinnati’s economy. In all, 
“the city’s imports were off about 13% and her exports only about 11%. “23 Loss of southern 
markets did not impact the agricultural output either. As the war continued, bumper crops and 
demand for North West grains actually led to economic posterity for many farmers in the North 
West. Historian Emerson D. Flight found that Chicago’s corn export, which, “before 1860 never 
above 11,000,000 bushels, averaged during the war 25,000,000 bushels.”24 Soon, the North West 
“became a granary for Great Britain, and to a small extent, the Continent [of Europe].”25 
Although the war’s onset caused economic ruin for many in the North West, generally farmers 
fared well during the war.  
The third and final reason historians offer for the growing Copperhead support 
throughout the war is racial prejudice. The greatest overarching political issue shared by 
Copperheads was opposing Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, and emancipation combined 
almost all of Copperhead fears into one nightmare: free blacks taking their jobs and a tyrannical 
government working outside the confines of the Constitution. Historian Jennifer L. Weber notes 
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Copperheads were known for the “depth and virulence”26 of their racism. Racial prejudice drew 
many different people to the Copperhead cause. Irish and German immigrants feared they would 
lose their jobs to newly freed blacks and many in the North simply regarded blacks “as inferior 
beings who were best off in bondage.”27 Race, clearly had a large role in Copperheads gaining 
support during the war. 
Playing on fears that freedmen would come north and take their jobs and their women, 
Copperhead leaders and newspaper editors made emancipation the war’s chief political debate.28 
Before the war, only the fringe Radical Republicans supported abolition, and supporting 
abolition outside of New England was to make oneself a political pariah. For just this reason, as 
a candidate for President, Lincoln’s presidential campaign did not support emancipation, but 
called instead for impeding the spread of slavery into the new territories won in the Mexican-
American War (1846-48). Until Lincoln emancipated the slaves in 1862, Copperhead criticisms 
were chiefly against Lincoln not abiding by the Constitution. Now, harkening back to Stephen 
Douglas’ assertion the war should only be fought for reuniting the country, the Copperheads had 
the political firepower they needed to amass more support throughout the North. 
Copperheads had always opposed the war, but Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation in 
1862 brought other Democrats to join their side and contributed to the Copperheads gaining the 
majority of the Indiana state representative. Race, along with not many significant Union 
victories, clearly influenced the election. Combatting emancipation became the calling cry for 
Copperheads across the North. The Copperhead newspaper Age contended the President’s 
unconstitutional attempt to free the slaves was not a question of law, but a “question of 
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anthropology, a question of science, which cannot be determined by Presidential dictum”.29 
James Gordon Bennett of the New York Herald wrote, “If this is a war of ideas then let the 
abolitionists fight for their ideas, and let the others stand back.”30 This sentiment is significant 
because it struck a chord with many in the North who supported the war for reuniting the 
country, but not for freeing the slaves. Moves toward emancipation validated their initial belief 
abolitionists from New England had started the war by threatening to do the very act Lincoln just 
proclaimed in to law. Copperheads were now vindicated in their belief the Southern states knew 
what was coming and left. Back in the North West, feelings against abolitionists ran so high 
abolitionist Wendell Phillips was egged during his speech in Cincinnati during 1862.31 Leading 
Copperhead Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham asserted that the war was being 
fought “for the purpose of crushing out liberty and erecting a despotism; a war for the freedom of 
the blacks, and the enslavement of the whites.”32 Emancipation made the Copperheads and Peace 
Democrats a popular ticket for racists and immigrants in the North who disliked blacks and 
feared they would take their jobs; yet, many in the north harbored these beliefs, and not all of 
them joined the Copperhead cause. 
The soldiers were split on emancipation. Historian Chandra Manning argues that soldiers 
were “intensely ideological,”33 and the relationship between slavery and the Civil War was not 
lost on any of them. Manning contends most Union soldiers saw themselves as the world’s 
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stewards for “liberty, equality, and self-government.”34 However, this sentiment was not shared 
by all Union men.  Union General Fitz-John Porter voiced the proclamation “prompted disgust, 
discontent, and expressions of disloyalty”35 among the men. Sergeant Ezra Bowlus in the 9th New 
Jersey similarly recorded “there is scarcely a man in the ranks of our army who approves of 
[emancipation].”36 Though sizable ammount in the Union army were opposed to emancipation, 
they still supported the war to unify the United States. Also, in anti-black bastions such as 
Southern Illinois, drops in Democratic votes do not support the theory all racists voted for the 
Democratic ticket. In other words, while every Copperhead was a racist, many Republicans were 
racist as well in the North. As historian Richard O. Curry puts it, “while Democrats, not 
Republicans attempted to make political capital by exploiting Negrophobia during war, 
unenlightened racial attitudes […] were not monopolized by the Democratic party.”37 
Emancipation was an even an issue within the Republican party.  
These three theories for why Copperheads enjoyed, at times, widespread support across 
the North help illustrate just who these people were during the Civil War. Some were Butternuts 
from Western Egypt whose parents were born in the south. Others were Irish and German 
immigrants who feared freed blacks taking their jobs. But many Copperheads did not fall in to 
these categories. Economic sectionalism, racial prejudice, and demographics do not adequately 
explain the significant and virulent opposition Copperheads posed for the Lincoln administration 
during the war. While all these factors surely played a role, something much more profound must 
have driven Copperheads across the north “to pick up the ballot, the pen, or the rifle to oppose 
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35 Weber, Copperheads, 67.	
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the war and the Lincoln Administration.”38 For many of these Copperheads, the country they had 
been raised in was becoming unrecognizable, and many felt their lives were endangered by the 
war and the Lincoln Administration’s policies. Before the Civil War most people only associated 
the postal service and presidential elections with the federal government. Now, the federal 
government had invaded every American’s life. Under Lincoln, the country’s first draft was 
issued, military tribunals tried civilians outside the theatre of war, and the first federal income 
tax was implemented. Democratic newspapers were being mobbed by Unionists, or censored by 
the military. Democrats often had to take oaths of allegiance to Union troops on leave, and many 
were arrested for simply criticizing the war. Weber comments, “the Civil War has often been 
called a brothers’ war, but… in the North it was a neighbors’ war as well.”39 In states, such as 
Illinois, where Lincoln won by the narrowest of margins, it was no surprise that towns were split 
down the middle in support for the war. For this reason, many Copperheads took up arms in 
denouncing the war effort, not because they wanted to secede, or hinder the draft, but because 
many were scared for their personal safety.  
A good example that explains how many Copperheads feared their rights were being 
taken away by the Lincoln Administration is the Hoskinsville Rebellion. The incident that 
sparked the rebellion began when seventeen-year-old Tertellus W. Brown wrote his nephew to 
come home and desert from the army. The letter never reached Brown’s nephew; instead, it was 
intercepted and its contents read by some army official, who notified the military provost 
marshal in Cincinnati. Corporal Davidson and U.S. Marshal Alexander Sands were then issued a 
civil warrant for Brown’s arrest and on March 9, 1863, an expedition of 150 men was dispatched 
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to arrest the seventeen year old Brown.40 That evening, the expedition went to Brown’s home. 
When he was not there, they seized his father as a hostage until the younger Brown was found. 
The next day, the company of Union soldiers made its way in to town and was met with armed 
resistance. Word had spread Union soldiers had taken Brown’s father hostage, and around one 
hundred armed men confronted the soldiers. No shots were fired and the soldiers retreated and 
were reinforced with another company of 150 men. The next day he soldiers arrested sixteen of 
these men from Noble County and returned to Cincinnati.  
 Tertellus Brown was never found and charged. During the entire rebellion not one soldier 
or Noble County civilian was killed. The incident, however, became a national headline. The 
New York Tribune’s headline exclaimed “Small Speck of War in Ohio,” and later alleged the 
insurrections were “the first results of the Copperhead doctrines preached throughout Ohio and 
Indiana.”41 Furthermore, “The Noble County Republican reported that men engaged in protecting 
the Hoskinsville deserter had passed one resolution ‘recommending the raising of money by 
contribution for the purchase of arms to enable them successfully to resist a draft, should another 
be ordered.”42 This did not happen. These men had arms, as evidenced by their opposing the 
Union troops, and did not need to pass a resolution to procure more. Furthermore, resisting the 
draft was not the issue at hand, these men were defending one of their own, a seventeen year old 
boy, from an entire company of soldiers. Historian Wayne Jordan asserts, “if they were 
insurgents, their insurgency had far more kinship with western Pennsylvania’s Whiskey 
Rebellion of an earlier day than it had with Southern Secession.”43 The news coverage continued 
to inflate the details. The Cincinnati Daily Gazette reported “the proportion of Union to Secesh 
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inhabitants was one to twenty” and that those loyal to the Union lived in “a state of continual 
fear.”44 This is a truly amazing report granted the county “voted for Lincoln in 1860 and … had 
given Tod (Republican) 1,650 votes to Jewett’s (Democrat) 1,292 in the state election of 1861.”45  
 The whole Hoskinsville incident, under closer examination, reeks of Union aggression 
against Copperheads in Noble County and validates many of their fears the government’s power 
was growing at the expense of their rights. Yes, Brown had encouraged a soldier to desert, but, 
he was a concerned boy writing to his loved one. Clearly, the letter never influenced the nephew 
because it never reached him it. Also, an entire company of soldiers to arrest a seventeen-year-
old boy seems a little heavy handed. An entire company of men descending on a town at night 
looking for a boy appears to be “well calculated to excite suspicion and create alarm.”46 Historian 
Wayne Johnson concludes his paper by stating, “while regretting any action that ran athwart the 
administration’s purpose of preserving the Union, one may at this distance applaud the zeal in 
behalf of civil rights.”47 This instance was not the first time Union soldiers on leave had 
provoked civilians in the North West, and it would not be the last.  
 The residents of Hoskinsville embody the feelings that united all Copperheads in the 
north: a genuine fear of their government bearing down on them unlawfully. Known Democrats 
had to swear oaths of allegiance in the north, and when Union soldiers on leave harassed 
Copperhead towns like Hoskinsville, Copperhead fears of government encroachment in to their 
daily lives proved to be valid. 
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The following sections will discuss two clear instances of when this unchecked central 
government disregarded the constitution. In analyzing the military arrests of Milligan and 
Vallandigham, it is apparent that the fear many in the north had of their government was well-
founded. With each case, this paper will seek to answer was their arrest truly necessary to the 
prosecution of the war, and, as claims of necessity are again and again disproved, it will ask what 
affect did these arrests actually produce? Historians disagree on how much effect the 
Copperheads had on the administration’s ability to prosecute the war. Weber contends the 
Copperheads indeed posed a threat, while Klement paints the Copperheads to be a paper tiger the 
Administration and Republican press played up to discredit the Democratic Party. As will be 
discussed in the following section, the actual military threat was largely insignificant; however, 
the political threat loomed large for the Lincoln Administration. Labeling and trying prominent 
Copperheads as traitors was politically expedient, not militarily necessary.  
	





II. Vallandigham’s Arrest and Trial  
 
 Rumors Vallandigham would be tried for treason circulated through Dayton, Ohio since 
as early as 1861. In the early hours of May 5 1863, he was finally arrested in his own home after 
denouncing Union General Ambrose Burnsides’ controversial General Order 38, which 
essentially outlawed any criticism against the Union war effort.  Union Captain Charles G. 
Hutton and his entire company of 150 men arrived at Vallandigham’s house to arrest the 
notorious Copperhead. Vallandigham initially resisted the arrest on the grounds no military 
officer possessed the right to arrest him. Vallandigham called from his window for the police, 
but it was to no avail. Eventually, the soldiers broke down the door and stormed in to the 
residence. Against the backdrop of his wife and sister-in-law shrieking, Vallandigham submitted 
to the soldiers and surrendered to Captain Hutton by uttering, “You have now broken open my 
house and overpowered me by superior force, and I am obliged to surrender.”48  
 What could Vallandigham have said in his speech to warrant being arrested? He was 
ultimately locked up for “publicly expressing, in violation of General Order 38 … sympathies for 
those in arms against the Government of the United States, declaring disloyal sentiments and 
opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its effort to 
suppress the unlawful rebellion.”49 Luckily, we have a transcript of most of his speech from the 
trial. The transcript reads: 
[Vallandigham] did publicly address a large meeting of citizens, and did utter 
sentiments in words, or in effect as follows, declaring the present war “a wicked, 
cruel and unnecessary war;” “a war not being waged for the preservation of the 
Union;” “a war for the purpose of crushing out the liberty and erecting a 
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despotism;” “a war for the freedom of the blacks and the enslavements of the 
whites;” stating “that if the Administration had so wished, the war could have 
been honorably terminated months ago;” that “peace might have been honorably 
obtained by listening to the proposed intermediation of France;” that 
“propositions by which the Northern States could be won back, and the South 
guaranteed their rights under the Constitution, had been rejected the day before 
the battle of Fredericksburg, by Lincoln and his minions,” meaning thereby the 
President of the United States and those under him in authority; charging that “the 
Government of the United States was about to appoint military marshals in every 
district, to restrain the people of their liberties, to deprive them of their rights and 
privileges;” characterizing General Orders No. 38, from Head-quarters 
Department of Ohio, as “a base usurpation of arbitrary authority,” inviting his 
hearers to resist the same, by saying, “the sooner the people inform the minions of 
usurped power that they will not submit to such restriction upon their liberties, the 
better;” declaring “that he was at all times, and upon all occasions, resolved to do 
what he could to defeat the attempts now being made to build up a monarchy 
upon the ruins of our free government;” asserting “that he firmly believed, as he 
did six months ago, that the men in power are attempting to establish a despotism 
in this country, more cruel and more oppressive than ever existed before.”50 
These words, besides outlining what the tribunal viewed as traitorous, also represent many of the 
beliefs Copperheads held. Vallandigham was eventually found guilty of treason against the 
																																																								




United States for these exact words, and was exiled to the Confederacy. With Vallandigham out 
of the country, the Lincoln Administration had silenced one of their loudest opponents. 
Was this arrest was truly necessary, and, if it was, should every U.S. citizen fear being 
arrested for criticizing the nation during times of war? While these initial charges seem quite 
vague, President Lincoln clarified what Vallandigham had actually done wrong by writing, “his 
arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops; to 
encourage desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military 
force to suppress it.”51 Preventing the raising of troops is a serious offense, but after a close 
reading of Vallandigham’s remarks it appears he never directly advocated his supporters not 
enlisting, he just criticized the draft itself. Furthermore, there are many reasons people did not 
enlist in the war, and these draft riots Republicans cite as being caused by Copperhead rhetoric 
had many other contributing factors. His words and actions had little to no effect on the Union’s 
ability to effectively prosecute the war. But, before answering this question, it is important to 
consider just who Clement Vallandigham was, and what threat he could potentially pose to the 
Lincoln Administration and the war effort. 
 If the Copperhead movement had a poster child, it would be Congressman Clement L. 
Vallandigham. During the war years he was a vocal conservative voice in Congress and resisted 
the changes the Civil War was imposing on the country, namely “the ascendency of 
industrialism, […] centralization of the government,”52 and Lincoln’s Emancipation 
Proclamation. For these reasons he was a champion of Butternuts in the North West and Irish 
and German immigrants across the north. He was also an ardent racist who viewed the war as 
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abolitionists imposing their political views on the entire country, but his most vicious attacks 
against the Lincoln Administration were based on the disregard Lincoln held for civil liberties. 
Vallandigham “even introduced a resolution calling for the arrest of President Lincoln if the 
rights of citizens continued to be violated.”53 Vallandigham was most incensed about the 
administration’s military arrests of citizens, and his reaction in many ways is warranted, given 
his eventual fate. During the Civil War “at least thirteen thousand civilians were held under 
military arrest,”54 and while most of these arrests were against deserters, draft dodgers, blockade-
runners, and people trading with the Confederacy, some were tried for disloyal speech and 
criticizing the government.  
 Some of these arrests for disloyal speech seem inconsequential to the war effort at large. 
The draft was controversial, and compulsory service under arms “had never been applied by 
national law”55 in the United States. Surely, questioning the legality of an unprecedented draft 
and denouncing it is not treason? One of the most important aspects of Vallandigham’s case is 
what preventing the raising of troops truly entails. Both Lincoln and the military tribunal accused 
Vallandigham of declaring disloyal sentiments that affected the war effort, but these charges 
actually entail the crime of treason. 
 Treason, prior to the Civil War, was commonly understood and defined within the 
Constitution as consisting of one crime and punishment, but this definition was inadequate 
within the context of the Civil War. Lincoln wanted to unite the nation, and he could not achieve 
this goal if he had to hang every traitor in the Confederacy. In order to adapt to the Civil War’s 
unique parameters, the definition of treason became more malleable, and the punishment, less 
severe. 
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One of the only crimes the Constitution clearly defines is treason, which emphasizes just 
how severe a charge it is. The Constitution’s definition of treason reads as follows, “Treason 
against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their 
enemies, giving them aid and comfort.”56 After defining the crime itself, the Constitution outlines 
the necessary proof to justify a conviction: 
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses 
to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. The Congress shall have 
power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work 
corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life person attainted.57 
By the time the Civil War began in 1861, judicial interpretations surrounding treason’s principles 
were clearly defined. Constitutional law historian J.G. Randall comments, “’Constructive 
Treason’ was eliminated. There must be an actual levying of war. A mere plotting, gathering of 
arms, or assemblage of men is not treason.”58 An example of Constructive Treason “is holding a 
man as traitor for advising treason when no levying of war has actually taken place.”59 Before the 
war, the consensus among legal experts was that uttering treasonous sentiments did not constitute 
a crime because no such levying of war had occurred. No forcible action had been committed 
against the U.S., and no assistance had been provided. Furthermore, what constituted providing 
the enemy aid and comfort was clearly defined as well. Providing aid and comfort consists “in 
furnishing military supplies, food, clothing, harbor, or concealment; communicating information; 
building, manning, and fitting out vessels; sending arms; contributing funds; and doing other 
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similar things.”60 In short, Randall summarizes providing aid and comfort as “a man levies war 
[or provides aid and comfort] when he acts with those who have had set it on foot.”61 If 
Vallandigham had truly provided aid and comfort, then he would have to actively aiding 
Confederate troops, or actual rioters. Before the war, Vallandigham would not, and could not 
have been tried for treason.  
 Through the war’s course, the legal language surrounding treason’s scope would change. 
Once the war commenced, special legislation was passed to shape the law of treason to fit the 
new emergency. The first piece of this legislation was the Conspiracies Act of July 31, 1861, and 
the law allowed the Lincoln Administration to try civilians under a new crime very similar to, 
but, not exactly, treason.  This law was passed because the original punishment for treason was 
death, and this punishment would be too severe for men the administration wanted to charge for 
semi-treasonable acts. The new law proposed a fine and imprisonment for those who conspired 
“to overthrow the government of the United States or to levy war against them, or to oppose by 
force the authority of the government.”62 The wording is almost identical to how treason is 
defined in the constitution. The minority opinion, also advocated by Vallandigham, was that this 
new law violated the constitutional provision whose purpose was, “to restrict the power of 
Congress in the creation of a political crime kindred to treason.”63 Treason was clearly defined in 
the Constitution by its framers, and there was even a clause that outlined the limits a legislative 
act could have on the law itself. In treason’s original definition as defined within the 
Constitution, “Congress shall have the power to declare the punishment of treason, but no 
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attainder shall work corruption of blood”.64 Congress’ inability to attainder treason through 
legislative acts is the clause the minority party cited that called in to question the Conscription 
Law’s legality.  
The legal ramifications of the constitution mentioning attainder in treason’s definition 
have one important implication: treason can only have one definition and one punishment. 
Attainder is the English Common Law term for inhibiting someone charged with treason from 
passing on his titles to his heirs. Because of its severe consequences, attainders of English 
noblemen were an effective means for the English crown to dissuade treason. For this reason, the 
Constitution’s framers protected American citizens from attainder by placing the responsibility 
to thwart attainder within the judicial branch. In this case, “the words ‘attainder of treason’ in the 
above-quoted clause relate, therefore, to attainder connected with a judicial sentence for treason, 
and not to attainder by legislative act.”65 Randall later simplifies what this distinction entails by 
writing, “While Congress, through its delegated powers, is enabled to define various crimes 
against the United States and provide for punishment, these specific constitutional limitations 
touching the particular crime of treason must not be overstepped.”66 In other words, while 
Congress can define various crimes and provide punishment for them, treason, the one law 
defined in the Constitution, is the exception. The clause entails that Congress does not have the 
authority to define another crime as treason because there is the possibility, because Congress 
can also provide punishment, that Congress could theoretically create another law, name it, 
perhaps, disloyal activities, and make the punishment for disloyal activities be attainder. This 
part of treason’s definition is significant because it outlines the two pre-war principles of treason: 
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treason can never be punished by attainder, and treason must have one definition and one 
punishment, and it is outside the legislature’s power to change any one of the principles. 
In 1862, Congress proceeded much farther in modifying the law of treason, and passed 
the second Confiscation Act. The new act “[provided] the court with an alternative and a power 
of discrimination as between the weightier and the lesser cases”67 of treason. Now, persons 
convicted of treason will either “suffer death…or, at the discretion of the court, he shall be 
imprisoned for not less than five years, and fined not less than ten thousand dollars.”68 Finally, 
the second Confiscation Act provided another provision for treason that was “particularly 
designed for the existing emergency.”69 The second section states: 
If any person shall hereafter incite, set on foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion 
or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or 
shall give aid or comfort thereto, or shall engage in, or give aid or comfort to, any 
existing rebellion or insurrection, and be convicted thereof, such person shall be 
punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by 
the liberation of all his slaves, if any he have; or by both of said punishments, at 
the discretion of the court.70 
The only notable addition to this definition of treason is the word incite. Inciting rebellion or 
insurrection again falls under the requirement that the person still forcibly incite others to levy 
war against the United States. In addition to adding incite, the second Confiscation Act also 
prohibited anyone accused of treason form holding elected office. The last additions to what 
constituted treason during the war came under sections 24 and 25 of the Conscription Act of 
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March 3, 1863. This act added a provision for those resisting the draft. Now, “enticing to desert, 
harboring or aiding the escape of deserters, resisting the draft or counseling such resistance, or 
dissuading from military duty” were all considered disloyal practices and warranted treason.71 
 Treason’s definition had changed and it appears the definitions added by the Conscription 
Act of 1863 were used to try dissenters like Vallandigham. The military tribunal’s transcript fails 
to mention Vallandigham stated, during the same speech, “the remedy” for all “the evils” 
mentioned in his speech was the “the ballot-box,” and that the “ballot-box” alone was the only 
means to hurl “King Lincoln” from his throne.72 These statements clarify what Vallandigham 
meant by “the people [informing]”73 the government they no longer agreed with their attacks on 
civil liberties. He asked his supporters to vote for the Democratic ticket; not openly resist the 
draft. The question still remains, were Vallandigham’s words detrimental to the Union’s ability 
to effectively prosecute the war? 
 Before answering this question, it might prove helpful to look at a case where treason, as 
originally defined within the constitution, was actually committed against the United States. 
Drueker vs. Salomon, a case from Wisconsin, is an example of how a draft resistor should be 
tried. In this case, Drueker appealed the ruling under grounds of false imprisonment for his crime 
of “levying war”74 against the United States. In the U.S., one of the two charges that fall under 
treason is levying war against the U.S.75 Drueker was charged with leading the resistance against 
government officials implementing the draft in Ozaukee County. In the court documents Drueker 
admitted he had made a flag, which said “No Draft,” and helped organize the mob that attacked 
the draft officials. When he led the mob in destroying houses in the town, Drueker hallooed 
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“Hurrah boys! I have got news from Milwaukee that they can’t draft there; and if they can’t 
draft there, they can’t draft here. Go on boys.”76 While Drueker denied inciting the crowd, 
many eyewitnesses testified he had, indeed, encouraged the crowd. It is clear Drueker made a 
conscious effort to resist the draft, but how the court found him guilty is especially important 
when considering Vallandigham’s case.  
 Drueker’s appeal was granted in order to answer whether the draft was legally 
authorized, and whether “he or those resisting the draft committed any crime against the laws 
of the United States.”77 The court agreed the draft was legal, but their argument on why 
Drueker committed the crime is important. The judge’s opinion held that levying war is the 
highest crime in the United States, and follows: 
 The settled interpretation is, that the words ‘ levying war ’ include not only the 
act of making war for the purpose of entirely overturning the government, but 
also any combination forcibly to oppose the execution of any public law of the 
United States, if accompanied or followed by an act of forcible opposition to 
such law, in pursuance of such combination. The following elements therefore 
constitute this offense: 1st. A combination or conspiracy, by which different 
individuals are united in one common purpose. 2nd. This purpose being to 
prevent the execution of some public law of the United States, by force. 3rd. 
The actual use of force by such combination, to prevent the execution of such 
law. […] Although there must be force used, it is not necessary that there 







not personally present at the immediate scene of violence, if they are leagued 
with the conspirators, and perform any part, however minute. 78 
Levying war, thus, depends on forcible opposition, and preventing the execution of some public 
law by force. Drueker was part of the mob that day in Ozaukee County, Wisconsin, and was 
forcibly preventing the execution of the Conscription Act of 1863, a U.S. public law. The 
judgment even included that force can be exerted by those not personally present at the scene of 
the crime, for instance, if they are in some way conspirators. This caveat, while expanding 
force’s scope beyond a physical action, still entails a causal relationship from the accused to the 
action itself. For instance, had he just painted the flag and not participated in the mob, his 
assistance, “however minute”79 would still fall under the charge levying war because he was 
present, and provided assistance.  
In the military case against Vallandigham, the presiding adjutant general would not 
charge Vallandigham with levying war, but, instead, with expressing sentiments, which “did aid, 
comfort, and encourage those in arms against their government.”80 Many people in the North 
disagreed and instead saw Vallandigham’s arrest as illegal. These sentiments were expressed in 
Erastus Corning’s letter to Lincoln and the Albany Resolves. At a Democratic rally in Albany, 
conservative Democrats such as Erastus Corning made a strong stand against Vallandigham’s 
arrest, and ratified ten resolutions which presented a case a against the Lincoln Administration. 
The Albany Resolves affirmed civil liberties must be honored and constitutional government 
maintained at all costs; arbitrary military arrests and military tribunals went against the principles 
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must honor the Constitution, and must “maintain the rights of the States and liberties of the 
citizens.”81  
The arrest itself was causing waves of discontent across the North, and it was one of the 
more publicized events from the war. Kentuckian George Richard Browder even mentioned the 
arrest in his diary, and even adds that, on the same day as Vallandigham’s arrest, in “[Kentucky] 
a man was arrested—taken to Louisville & imprisoned by military for speaking disrespectfully 
of the President!—but was released.”82 Vallandigham quickly became a household name, and for 
many Americans he became a martyr for defending the civil liberties. Over 13,000 northerners 
were imprisoned during the war, which is approximately one out of every 1,692 Americans in 
the north. Almost every American knew someone, or knew of someone directly who had been 
tried under military tribunals, and these arbitrary arrests were, fittingly, decried by northern 
Democrats.  
 Lincoln, reacting to the public outcry expressed across the nation, penned his response to 
these Albany Resolves in a letter addressed to Erastus Corning and others. In his letter, Lincoln 
lays out his case in support for the military trials. Lincoln begins his response by admitting that 
these arrests “were not made for treason—that is, not for the treason defined in the constitution, 
and upon the conviction of which, the punishment is death.”83 Lincoln continues his defense by 
stating that civil liberties should be maintained; “except when, in the case of rebellion or 
invasion, the public safety may require their suspension.”84 Lincoln’s entire defense rests upon 
this line, and it is referred to as the doctrine of necessity. In times of insurrection, where the 
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public safety might require such action, “arrests are made, not so much for what has been done, 
as for what probably would be done.”85 On whether military commissions have constitutional 
authority to try citizens where rebellion does not exist, the President again cites that these trials 
can be conducted if, anywhere in the United States, public safety is concerned. Preserving public 
safety could mean “[preventing] the rebellion extending,” “[restraining] mischievous interference 
with the raising and supplying of armies,” and even “[restraining] the enticing men out of the 
army.”86 Lincoln puts to rest the argument Vallandigham’s arrest was politically motivated by 
writing, “he was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the 
administration, or the personal interests of the commanding general; but because he was 
damaging the army, upon the existence of which, the life of the nation depends on.” Finally, 
Lincoln provides one of his most famous aphorisms from the war, “Must I shoot a simple-
minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wiley agitator who induces 
him to desert?”87  
 The letter is one of Lincoln’s most famous pieces of correspondence from the war, and 
outlines his argument that the war powers in the Constitution gave him wide legal authority on 
matters of preserving public safety. In his letter, Lincoln cites preventing the rebellion from 
spreading as one justification for his wartime measures. If Lincoln’s defense is to be considered 
valid, then desertion and draft dodging must have been exceedingly rampant in areas with high 
levels of Copperhead support. Furthermore, the threat of the rebellion spreading to the North 
West must be credible. Upon further analysis, Lincoln’s claims of necessity do not hold water.  
 Lincoln’s claims that Vallandigham’s rhetoric damaged the army by prompting soldiers 
to desert ignores the fact a multitude of factors cause desertion, namely the army’s living 
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conditions, poor morale following defeats, the issue of emancipation, and a bounty system that 
encouraged Union men to desert in order to be paid again upon reenlistment. The living 
conditions in the Union army were abhorrent, and more soldiers died of disease than lead. 
Massachusetts volunteer Charles Harvey Brewster wrote that farmers in his hometown “would 
call it cruelty to animals to keep their hogs in as bad a place as we have to live and sleep.”88 
Furthermore, the Union armies, especially in the East, were not enjoying much success against 
their rebel counterparts. Summarizing the military ineptitude of the Union general staff before 
Grant assumed command could fill volumes, but defeats at the First and Second Bull Run and 
Chancellorsville lowered morale. Even when the Union won a battle like Antietam, there were 
significant missed opportunities because confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern 
Virginia was able to escape. Also, upon hearing about the massive casualties, concerned family 
members wrote for their boys to come home. A concerned uncle from McDonough County wrote 
his nephew, “Richard, take a fool’s advice and come home if you have to desert… you will be 
protected—the people are so enraged that you need not be alarmed if you hear of the whole of 
the North West killing off abolitionists.”89  
 A third factor shaping desertion was Lincoln’s own decision to emancipate the slaves. 
Historian Jennifer Weber argues Copperhead rhetoric did, in fact, encourage desertions; 
however, her argument assumes soldiers operated in a political vacuum, where, without 
Copperhead criticisms of the Emancipation Proclamation and Democratic news outlets, soldiers 
would never question the controversial proclamation. Weber writes that “dissidents’ resistance to 
conscription and their encouragement of less ideologically minded Americans to dodge the draft 
or desert the army forced the military to divide its attention and at times send troops home to 
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keep order there.”90 As has been previously stated, not all soldiers in the Union army supported 
the Emancipation Proclamation, and some vehemently opposed it. Many Union soldiers would 
come to accept emancipation as necessary to ending the war and reuniting the nation, but some 
could not. Both Democrats and Republicans volunteered for the war, and to think only 
Copperhead rhetoric turned soldiers sour on the Emancipation Proclamation ignored the reality 
that soldiers from the north all had different and individual political leanings before the war.  
Some soldiers, like Corporal John J. Barney, seem to advocate Weber’s line of reasoning, 
though, by echoing the one of the reasons men deserted was because the Northern press was 
“howling about the emancipation proclamation and fighting to ‘free niggers.’”91 Claiming the 
Democratic press in the North made soldiers’ decisions for them is absurd; if the press is blamed 
for soldiers deserting then couldn’t those who passed the controversial measure the press and 
soldiers were complaining about be held responsible too? Interestingly enough, in Copperhead 
hotbeds such as southern Illinois, “some counties in ‘little Egypt’ over-subscribed their quotas by 
nearly fifty percent.”92 Draft numbers did not drop in the Copperhead counties. Furthermore, 
Massac County on the Illinois border with Kentucky, “enlisted five-sixths of its entire voting 
population.”93 Despite resistance to the draft across Illinois, only .013 percent of the 259,092 
Illinoisans serving in the Union army were drafted.94  
This statistic is a little misleading; the draft itself was more of a means to coerce 
volunteers than anything else. Volunteers received bounties, or more money. Draftees did not, 
but, still, in a region known for its virulent Copperheads, the statistics indicate draft resistance 
was not a significant issue and the supply of more men appears unobstructed. The bounty system 
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was one of the leading causes of desertion in the war, and historian Judith Lee Hallock attributes 
this to the fact that it encouraged less wealthy men to desert in order to work the system.95 
Bounties would slow enlistments because cities and towns offered more money for volunteers. 
Such a system encouraged men to “enlist, claim the bounty, and leave the area without ever 
showing up for muster.”96 Once one town was duped, these men would simply go to the next 
town and repeat the process. Finally, the government allowed those with the means to pay 300 
dollars for a draft substitute. If the life of the nation truly depended on the army being amply 
supplied with men, substitution raises questions as to whether Lincoln’s doctrine of necessity to 
the war effort applied to all Americans. 
 The draft had many issues that attributed to it not being a success, but Vallandigham’s 
rhetoric was not one of these. While it is impossible to gauge how many more men volunteered 
rather than being drafted, the draft made sure the Union never had a lack of manpower to 
prosecute the war. Of the 76,829 men who were drafted, only 46,347, roughly sixty percent, 
actually showed up. The situation did not improve as the war went along. 13.5 percent of 
draftees failed to report in July 1863. In July 1864, during the grueling overland campaign 
against Lee, which saw the war’s highest sustained rate of casualties, 28.5 percent of draftees 
failed to show up.97 If these figures are indicative of any conclusion, it is that the Union’s 
military prospects influenced those resisting the draft most heavily. If Weber and Lincoln still 
maintain Copperhead rhetoric significantly impacted the draft, then they are both complicit in 
providing the Union army its scapegoat for military failures, high casualty rates, and 
controversial proclamations.  
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 Weber also notes the government had to divert resources to maintain order and quell draft 
riots, and claims this fact gives credence to Lincoln’s doctrine of necessity. Under closer 
examination, draft riots were actually quite infrequent in the north, and were sometimes caused 
by the Union army itself. The Hoskinsville Rebellion is a perfect example of how the Union 
Army sometimes provoked these riots. Also, the news reports chronicling the Hoskinsville 
Rebellion show a Republican tendency to embellish riots to paint Democrats in a poor light. As 
explained in the previous section, there really was no riot. With the Hoskinsville Rebellion in 
mind, Union reports of rampant riots need to be taken with a grain of salt. 
 Another notable draft riot was the riot in New York City, and this was the deadliest riot 
from the war. This riot is often the one cited for having the most Copperhead influence, mainly 
because of New York Mayor, and ardent Copperhead, Fernando Wood’s speeches. Before the 
Civil War even began, Democrats had warned immigrants “If Lincoln is elected to-day, you will 
have to compete with the labor of four million emancipated negroes.”98 However, while the 
Democrats pandered to immigrants in the hopes of getting re-elected, the Catholic Archbishop of 
New York also opposed the war because he did not want to see Catholic Irish and German 
workers out of work.99 While Copperheads profited from these fears in the form of votes, the 
underlying cause of the riots was based upon race, and, to some extent religion. While the 
Republican Party embraced abolition, it had a history of harboring resentment for Catholics. The 
combination of Union defeats, the draft, emancipation, and longstanding hostilities toward black 
laborers in the city finally boiled over on July 13th. Copperhead rhetoric, while clearly stoking 
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the flames, could not cause or exacerbate a riot that had clearly outlined cultural and racial 
causes that predate the Copperhead movement. 
These riots need to be considered under a lens that critically analyzes how much 
influence Copperheads actually had on these riots taking place because if rhetoric did not incite 
these riots, then the case against Vallandigham does not hold water. In some cases the underlying 
causes for these riots were decades in the making. In the case of the Hoskinsville Rebellion, the 
Union Army itself instigated the entire altercation. For many in the North West, the draft 
symbolized everything they considered wrong with the country, namely an expanded central 
government and a war fought for emancipation. Accusations that politicians such as 
Vallandigham played a part in encouraging these riots ignore the facts that racism existed in the 
North West before the term Copperhead was even coined.  
 Judge Leavitt’s opinion on Vallandigham’s case casts some more doubts on 
whether Lincoln’s doctrine of necessity was warranted. Vallandigham, after being tried and 
found guilty of encouraging draft resistance by the military tribunal, looked to the courts to be 
his savior. Hon. Judge George E. Pugh “moved for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Mr. 
Vallandigham before Judge Humphrey H. Leavitt of the United States Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio.”100 Although Congress had authorized the president to suspend habeas corpus 
throughout the nation, he had not yet suspended it in Ohio. Leavitt tipped off General Burnside 
of the pending writ, and Burnside doubled down and asserted it was his legal and constitutional 
right to arrest Vallandigham. General Burnsides, as the commander of the Department of Ohio, 
characterized the lands north of the Ohio River “a vast army camp,”101 and every soldier and 
civilian was under his authority. General Burnside’s modesty in describing the extent of his 
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domain perhaps gives more weight to the argument Vallandigham was imprisoned for 
“[damaging]… the personal interests of the commanding general”102 than hindering the 
prosecution of the war. Pugh defended Vallandigham and Cincinnati attorney Benjamin F. Perry 
defended General Burnsides. Perry argued the doctrine of necessity supported General 
Burnside’s actions, while Pugh affirmed, “We cannot move a single step but we do not see with 
what jealous care our fathers handcuffed military power.”103  
Leavitt did not grant the writ, on grounds of moral guilt. This treason did not exist in the 
law, or the constitution. In fact, prior to Leavitt’s opinion in 1863, this form of treason had never 
existed in recorded history.  In his ruling, Leavitt surmised that those who criticize a government 
during times of strife “should expect”104 to be treated arbitrarily. Leavitt finally ruled that, “The 
sole question is whether the arrest was legal;… its legality depends on the necessity which 
existed for making it, and of that necessity… this court cannot judiciously agree.”105 Essentially, 
Leavitt admits that the legality of Vallandigham’s arrest depended on whether it was a military 
necessity to arrest him in the first place. Leavitt, opting to dither rather than be decisive, made no 
effort to define what constitutes necessity and ruled the powers that be define necessity. In this 
case, the powers that be are solely the Lincoln Administration and the military. The judiciary’s 
power during the Civil War simply could not extend to these military tribunals. Why the 
judiciary could not even rule on military matters will be discussed in the section on Lincoln’s 
executive powers. Necessity ruled the day, and no one besides Lincoln himself could define it.  
The threshold that must be breached for criticism to become treason is intentionally not 
defined in this ruling, and it remains so to this day. Under treason’s previous interpretations, 
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Vallandigham’s speech, that day, would have had to start a riot that impeded the draft for him to 
be found guilty. Vallandigham’s case represents two glaring conclusions: his arrest was a not a 
military necessity, and, during times of crisis, there is no safeguard for executive overreach. 
Lincoln’s redefining of what constitutes treason was not born from malicious intent. Treason 
could only be sentenced with death as its punishment before the Conspiracy Act and the 
subsequent acts that followed. While Lincoln expanded treason’s scope to allow for more lenient 
sentencing, this expansion allowed for semi-treasonous activities to fall under these new laws of 
treason. Lincoln was right in his letter to Corning, this was not your father’s treason law from the 
past. By redefining treason, Lincoln changed the definition to suit his immediate needs. Via this 
process, Constructive Treason became synonymous with treason. Though civilians were not tried 
under the treason defined in the constitution, when they were read their sentences, the military 














 Like Vallandigham, Milligan was also unlawfully tried in front of a military tribunal. 
Milligan was arrested in connection to a secret society called the Sons of Liberty, and the 
society’s leading members were all arrested for a shelved plot to free Confederate prisoners of 
war. This conspiracy seemingly validated Lincoln’s fear of a fire in the rear in the North West, 
and explains why he wanted “to prevent the rebellion extending.”106 However, the matter of 
whether these secret societies posed any real threat to the war effort remains. Under closer 
examination, it appears that not only that the military threat these secret societies posed was 
overblown, but also that it was overblown for political reasons.  
Any book or article discussing the Copperheads during the Civil War will without a 
doubt mention these secret societies, and historians disagree as to how significant a threat they 
actually posed. Copperhead historian Frank Klement concludes these secret societies were 
nothing more than a paper tiger to paint the Democrats in a negative light, but historians Robert 
Churchill and Jennifer Weber argue these Copperhead secret societies did pose a threat. By 
considering these secret societies within the context of Illinois politics during this time, it 
appears their true character was misrepresented for political gain. This section’s discussion will 
focus primarily on the Milligan Case and the Sons of Liberty conspiracy in the North West. The 
Order of the Golden Circle will also be discussed, and the lies about this order will help suggest 
there was some political gain to be had in exaggerating these secret societies. Because this 
section is focused on whether there was any political motive trying these orders, the Indiana 
Election in 1864 will be considered, as well as the presidential election of the same year. 
 First off, these secret societies were largely joined for protection, as well as fulfilling a 






neighbor on neighbor violence. Some counties were evenly divided between Democrats and 
Republicans, and these secret societies served the function of policing political disputes between 
the too parties. The Copperheads were not the only faction with secret societies; the Republican 
Party also had its own Union League. The main purpose of these societies was for self-defense, 
and “[Copperheads] took precautions against the perceived threat of their Unionist neighbors by 
banding together in mutual protection societies.”107 Union soldiers on leave sometimes harassed 
these Butternuts, and vice versa. Furthermore, “over the winter of 1864, mobs, often spearheaded 
by soldiers on leave, sacked the offices of half a dozen newspapers in the West.”108 J. Frederick 
Bollmeyer, Vallandigham’s friend and editor of the Dayton Daily Empire, “had been shot by a 
Republican neighbor during a personal argument.”109 These were violent times, and joining these 
societies could provide safety.  
These Copperhead societies provided safety, but they were not a fighting force. Weber 
describes these Copperhead secret societies as being “paramilitary [organizations] modeled after 
secret fraternal orders that were so popular in the antebellum United States.”110 Labeling these 
secret societies as paramilitary organizations is an unwarranted classification. The term 
“paramilitary” conjures images of the Contra Rebels, or the Mujahedeen. The Sons of Liberty 
and Knights of the Golden Circle, as will be later shown, do not make the cut. These secret 
societies served as social groups too, and were largely comprised of farmers who supplied their 
own arms and met probably twice every month. In short, anyone who truly believed these 
conspiracies of a North Western Confederacy were realistic held these groups in to high regard.  
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If these societies did not pose that great a threat, militarily, why were there so many fears 
surrounding them and their conspiracies? In short, reporting on secret Democratic societies 
trying to break away from the Union and free prisoners of war was great propaganda to paint the 
Democratic party in a poor light, and details from the Milligan case and other secret societies 
help affirm this fact. The Milligan case is significant in that it was later decided trying Milligan 
under a military tribunal was unconstitutional, but, in regards to the whether these arrests had a 
political element attached to them, this case sheds light on how easy it was for Republicans like 
Governor Morton to try their political opponents with treason.  
The military and Republican conspiracy to embellish these secret societies to the public 
and the War Department finds its origins with the Knights of the Golden Company (KGC) and, 
then, Colonel Carrington. The KGC were founded by “charlatan extraordinary and whimsical 
wanderer”111 George W. L. Bickley. With his pen and his imagination, he hoped to get rich quick 
by selling ten dollar membership fees to his new secret organization. The clubs stated aim was to 
“colonize and finally annex northern Mexico to the Dominion of the United States.”112 In 1859 
Bickley traveled all around the nation to try and swindle more people in to joining his 
organization, and eventually ended up in Texas. Having failed in getting enough money from 
new members, Bickley picked up on the growing secession sentiment and “tried to transform his 
paper based society into an organization dedicated to repelling a Yankee invasion and 
guaranteeing Southern rights.”113 In Kentucky he lied that he had eight thousand members, and 
the Order gained national attention as being dangerous organization. Democrats in the North 
West, seeking to use the hype surrounding the Order, penned exposes that characterized the 
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Order as traitorous organization. Yet, during this whole time no order existed. In time, the name 
recognition of the order would prompt Republicans to fabricate KGC reports to discredit 
Democrats in Michigan and Illinois.114 Republican editors ran with the secret society craze and 
soon, another offshoot of the KGC emerged: the treacherous Mutual Protective Society.115 
 The Republican interest in propagating KGC headlines was clearly politically motivated, 
and the Report of the United States Grand Jury for the District of Indiana clearly shows this. 
More than a hundred citizens were tried in front of this grand jury for crimes ranging from 
corruption to murder to disloyalty. Forty-seven indictments, none mentioning the KGC, were 
returned. Following the indictments, “the juryman attached an obiter dictum of their own 
creation”116 which dealt with the KGC’s activities in Indiana. The report detailed how the KGC 
and other secret societies had fifteen thousand members throughout Indiana, and how many 
Confederate prisoners at Camp Morton were belonged to the order.117 Coincidentally, the report 
was published while the Democrat State Convention was being held.118 The allegations of 
conspiracy fell on deaf ears, and the Democrats “elected nine of the fourteen members of 
Congress and secured control of both houses of the state legislature.”119 Governor Morton, 
realized something had to be done in the wake of Democrat victories and continued the policy he 
was most familiar with: fabricating conspiracies and secret societies. Morton “marshaled a 
coterie of aids”120 including Colonel Carrington, the adjutant general of the State of Indiana, and 
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the editor of the Indiana Daily Journal, and formed, as Klement scathingly labels them, the 
“Indianapolis Junta.”121  
 Up until this point the KGC had only been used to affect local politics in the North West, 
but once Carrington got involved, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton began receiving letters about 
“A secret society [existing] in this vicinity to incite desertion of soldiers with their arms, to resist 
arrest of deserters, to stop enlistments, to disorganize the army, to prevent further drafting—in 
short, a distinct avowal to stop this war.”122 Stanton, as Secretary of War, was probably flooded 
with information every day on enemy activity, but it appears these reports from Carrington and 
Morton held considerable sway over how the Administration viewed opposition to the war effort 
in the North West. These correspondences began in 1862, and these false reports do make it 
appear, on the surface, that the North West was teetering on the edge of seceding, or if not 
seceding, increased resistance to the war effort. On January 14, 1863, Carrington sent another 
five-page report directly to President Lincoln himself, advocating for firmness and force to crush 
treason in the North West.123 All of these reports from the field indicating treasonous activities 
had to been taken seriously hundreds of miles away in Washington D.C. Carrington eventually 
fell out of favor with the War Department, perhaps due to his persistent reports of the looming 
KGC threat.  
In all, Carrington and Morton’s fabrication suggest that painting these Copperheads as 
traitors in secret societies could serve two distinct purposes: vilify Democrats and justify the 
Lincoln Administration’s arbitrary arrests. Weber does not seem to care whether reports of a 
North West Conspiracy were true or not, and instead argues “what is most important is that 
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contemporaries heard these stories, believed them, and made decisions based on that belief.”124 
She argues that both Lincoln and Confederate President Jefferson Davis believed these reports 
and acted on them, and, in reviewing Lincoln’s redefinition of treason in the 1863 Conscription 
Act, it is likely Lincoln had Carrington’s fanciful report in the back of his mind while 
authorizing it. However, Weber is missing the significance of what the lies created by Carrington 
and Morton truly entail.  
Under military tribunals, civilians were not tried in front of their peers, and, as seen in the 
Vallandigham case, even where writs of habeas corpus could be granted, Judge Leavitt could not 
adjudicate a military tribunal because he could not legally determine what constituted necessity. 
Therefore, under the new definitions of treason implemented by the administration in which 
disloyal sentiments could now be construed as counseling resistance, any association with an 
actual secret society in the North West could warrant arbitrary arrest because secret societies had 
now become synonymous with establishing a North West Conspiracy. Though the Knights of the 
Golden Circle were a Republican fantasy, who, amidst the fog of war, could delineate whether 
these plots existed, or not. The political advantage of portraying Democrats in a poor light 
coupled with ability to arbitrarily arrest any citizen creates a circumstance where it is politically 
expedient to try Copperheads, like Vallandigham and Milligan as traitors.  
The Knights of the Golden Circle only existed in the minds of Republicans who either 
invented these false reports, or Republicans who believed they existed. Hopefully, this secret 
order’s discussion supports one conclusion: the reports issued to both Lincoln and Stanton show 
that both government and military officials, working together, in Indiana fabricated threats of 
treason to vilify their political opponents. The Sons of Liberty were another secret society in 
																																																								




Indiana, and unlike the Knights of the Golden Circle, this group was real. At the height of their 
activity the Sons of Liberty had 18,000 members in the North West.125 This is the secret society 
Milligan belonged to. The Sons of Liberty failed to live up to their billing as a secret society; 
their “secrets and proceedings were never successfully concealed.”126 Governor Morton and, 
now, General Carrington had double agents within the society and new what the Sons of Liberty 
were going to do before many of the members were even informed. 
Harrison H. Dodd, the secret society’s leader, decided, with the Union gaining the 
advantage more and more every day, it was time to act. On August 2, 1864 he divulged his plan 
to his most trusted members, Carrington’s spy being one of them. Now, two years later, it 
seemed real Copperheads were finally realizing Carrington’s fantasies of the KGC liberating 
Camp Morton and establishing a North Western Confederacy. It might seem interesting that the 
plan proposed by the Dodd is the same one imagined by Carrington years earlier, but, for 
Copperheads in Indiana, liberating Camp Morton was the only viable option for affecting the war 
in any significant way. Dodd ended up sharing his plan with J.J. Bingham, editor of the 
Indianapolis Sentinel and chairman of the Democrat State Central Committee. Bingham refused 
to cooperate and instead notified fellow notable Democrats in the state of Dodd’s plan. These 
leading Democrats, knowing how bad this conspiracy would make their party look, made Dodd 
swear the plan would be abandoned.127 Thus, endless rumors that secret societies would ignite an 
armed rebellion in the North West amounted to aborted plans and Republican imaginations. 
While Dodd’s plans would be shelved for the time being, Morton’s was just beginning to take 
shape. 
																																																								
125	Kenneth M. Stampp, “The Milligan Case and the Election of 1864 in Indiana” The Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1944) 45. 
126 Stampp, “Milligan Case and the,” 46	




 On the night of August 20, 1864, military authorities raided Dodd’s printing house and 
found ammunition and four hundred revolvers.128 During the raid they also discovered a member 
list for all the society’s prominent members, and, to Morton’s delight, several Democratic 
candidates for state offices were named. For Morton, nailing Dodd was just the beginning. The 
governor of Indiana intended for the entire Indiana Democratic Party to go up in flames. Morton 
wanted to try the leaders but his loyal lackey, Carrington, for once, did not share his enthusiasm. 
General Carrington, after years of publishing make-believe partisan tales of treachery, did not 
want to go through with actually charging the leaders because he believed he did not possess the 
legal right to try these individuals while the regular courts remained open. Morton pressed on 
with the charges, believing that an immediate trial was “essential to the success of the National 
cause in the autumn elections.”129 The fact that Morton notified Stanton of his plan makes the 
Administration complicit at this point for using the military tribunals for political purposes. 
Morton’s letter to Stanton in this instance shows that the Administration new all to well the 
power afforded to it under the doctrine of necessity, and utilized this power to exact political 
gain before the crucial election of 1864. 
 The election of 1864 was on the mind of every Republican in the nation, and perhaps the 
fear the Democrats could win prompted more of these tribunals. The election would go down in 
history as the first and only democratically held election while a nation was engaged in a civil 
war. Though this paper is concerned with Lincoln’s appropriating too much power within the 
executive branch during the war and trampling on civil liberties, the fact that this election 
actually took place is a testament to Lincoln’s leadership during the war. In the months leading 
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up to the election “the people [were] wild for peace,”130 and even Lincoln believed “it [seemed] 
exceedingly probable that this administration will not be reelected.”131 War weariness was the 
leading cause for this sentiment, but also Grant’s overland campaign against General Lee was 
causing outrage at home. At a moment when everyone assumed the Confederacy was on its last 
heels, the casualties continued to mount and became hard to reconcile. Since Grant’s wilderness 
campaign had begun on May 5th through early July, sixty-four thousand casualties had been 
sustained.132 In response to the mounting casualties, C. Chauncey Burr, editor of the Old Guard 
denounced General Grant’s slaughter by voicing, “What is the difference between a butcher and 
a general? A butcher kills animals for food. A general kills men to gratify the ambition or malice 
of politicians and scoundrels.”133 In addition to this casualties mounting, it was rumored that 
former Army of the Potomac General McClellan would be the presidential nominee. Though 
relieved of his command, the former General still had good standing with many in the army and 
had allies in Washington. When Morton wrote Stanton in August, many, including Lincoln 
himself, doubted he would be reelected come November.  
 The trial against Dodd and the other leaders commenced when Stanton gave Morton the 
go ahead. While it was easy to try Dodd, granted he confessed his plan to a double agent, 
convicting the other leaders who, for all intents and purposes, were not known in the hearing as 
co-conspirators, proved difficult. Furthermore, the lead witness in the case, the double agent, 
“was obliged to confess that he had no direct knowledge of the society’s alleged military branch, 
and that he had never seen any of its members engage in military drill.”134 If the double agent, 
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who was a high enough ranking member to learn of the plot, could not attest to the society’s 
military activities, then the society’s military capability and overall threat to the Union war effort 
was negligible at best. The systematic effort to charge the whole Democratic party with 
participating in this conspiracy is illustrated in the judge advocate’s following questions to a 
witness: 
Q. Of what political faith were the majority of men comprising that organization 
[Sons of Liberty]? 
A. They were all Democrats. 
Q. State whether any other class of men were admitted, or was it sine quo [sic] 
non that a man must be a Democrat? 
A. I do not think that anyone would have got in unless he professed to be a 
Democrat.135 
Generals Hovey and Carrington, who remained in Indiana, were on the campaign trail for the 
Union party. Judge Advocate Burnett divided his time between his duty hearing the case and 
“[delivering] less subtle political speeches at local Union meetings.”136 The partisan makeup 
surrounding the whole proceedings has all the makings of a show trial. The trial and its coverage 
in the press made one fact abundantly clear for the people of Indiana: “all Sons of Liberty were 
traitors and […] most Democrats were Sons of Liberty.”137 In consequence of the trial, one of 
Morton’s secretaries exclaimed, “The exposure of the Sons of Liberty is tearing the ranks of the 
Democracy all to flinders. McClellan stock is not quoted at all. McDonald stock is fast going 
down.”138 The trial, coupled with military victories in September, saved the Union party come 
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the fall the elections. Dodd eventually escaped to Canada, and the military court found Bowles, 
Milligan, Horsey, and Humphrey guilty. 
 The Supreme Court case Ex Parte Milligan later reversed these charges. The court ruled 
that the military commission, in fact, did not have jurisdiction over their cases. Constitutional 
Law Historian J. G. Randall cites the Ex Parte Milligan decision as “one of the bulwarks of 
American civil liberty”139 The ruling reads as followed: 
Martial Law can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and 
unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction, … the Constitution of the United States 
is a law for the rulers and people, equally in war and peace, and covers with the 
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all 
circumstances.140 
This ruling entails certain parameters for the general subject of martial law going forward. First, 
the president has the power to suspend habeas corpus only within recognized zones of military 
conflict, and only in during emergencies. Second, military trials, not preventative detentions, are 
permissible during war, but only within recognized zones of military conflict. Finally, the claim 
of military necessity in Indiana was factually implausible. As discussed here in this section, no 
forcible acts against the government took place saying this act impeded the Union’s ability to 
effectively prosecute the war “would require greatly stretching the recognized boundaries of 
military jurisdiction.”141 In reality, “necessity must be actual and present.”142 In the cases of both 
Vallandigham and Milligan, the claims of necessity do not hold. 
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V. Lincoln’s Unchecked Executive Authority 
The ruling provided by Ex Parte Milligan is great in correcting the bad precedent set by 




too late. It is important to note how Lincoln’s executive authority increased throughout the war, 
and why the Supreme Court could not effectively check executive authority in the war. 
 The grounds for which Lincoln attained unbridled power as the executive can be traced to 
very onset of the war. The Civil War presents many constitutional problems for the simple fact 
that it is a civil war. The Confederate States of American (CSA) were never formally recognized 
as a belligerent state, and this initially posed problems for the Union in how to issue a blockade 
of the South, and deter foreign intervention from European powers such as Great Britain and 
France. Because the war required quick and decisive action, Congress often acted in a 
reactionary manner in regard to Lincoln’s policies as both the executive and commander in chief 
of the armed forces. Also, because the Southern congressman left Washington, Lincoln was 
afforded a Congress in which his party largely held the majority the entire war. All of these 
factors contributed to a situation where the Judicial Branch could not adequately check the 
executive branch’s power because of his role as commander in chief of the military. 
 When the war began, Lincoln acted with war powers before any formal declaration was 
legislated by Congress. The U.S. Constitution clearly outlines that only Congress has the right to 
declare war. When the war broke out, one of the first actions Lincoln approved was the blockade 
of all Southern Ports. Because “Congress alone has the right to declare war, the President’s 
power of suppressing an insurrection in not tantamount to the war power; and his right to 
promulgate a blockade order only becomes valid after war has become a legal fact through 
congressional declaration.”143 Lincoln had been persecuting the war without the war powers 
granted to him Until Congress officially declared war on July 13, 1861,  To amend this period of 
approximately two months in which Lincoln operated outside his role as the executive, Congress 
																																																								




passed an act “approving, legalizing and making valid all acts of the President, as if they had 
been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of Congress.”144 This act 
is very significant because the legislative branch is essentially reacting to, and subsequently 
approving these acts after the fact. This arrangement “argues a curious commingling of 
legislative and executive functions for a President to perform an act which he adjudges to be 
within the competence of Congress and then, when the measure has been irrevocably taken, to 
present Congress with an accomplished fact for its subsequent sanction.”145 In other words, 
Lincoln was exercising legislative power as an executive, anticipating whatever he did in time 
would be ratified by the very legislative branch he is acting in place of. One does not have to be 
a constitutional law historian to see this curious arrangement is bad practice, especially granted, 
“the Supreme Court is hardly an effective barrier against executive assertion.”146 
 The President’s powers became more expansive after the writ of habeas corpus was 
suspended. Now vested entirely with the war powers, the President can now create a legal state 
of insurrection, and under this state “the courts will accept his action in the matter as conclusive 
and binding upon them.”147 Once a state of insurrection is declared, the President may now 
suspend the habeas corpus privilege. This suspension entails sweeping powers in the districts 
where habeas corpus is suspended, “for officials acting under the authority of the President may 
then make arrests without warrant for offenses undefined in the laws, without having to answer 
for such acts before the regular courts.”148 Habeas corpus could only be suspended in states of 
insurrection. As the war progressed, Lincoln would expand the state of insurrection to 
encompass most of the Union under the doctrine of necessity. Thus, Lincoln’s officials wielded 
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power over the American civilian never seen before, or since, the Civil War. Similar to the 
aforementioned curious relationship between the Republican legislature and the President, 
Congress’ “long inaction [in regard to sanctioning Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus] 
served as a tacit sanction of the president’s right.”149 
 The Commission Act and the implementation of military tribunals to try civilians are 
most applicable to this paper’s discussion regarding the two cases brought against Vallandigham 
and Milligan, because both were charged under military tribunals. During the war the supreme 
court’s attitude was passive toward offering a ruling on whether civilians could be tried outside 
of zones of military conduct. When Judge Pugh asked for a writ of habeas corpus to be granted 
to Vallandigham, Judge Advocated General Holt advocated, “the act [of habeas corpus] as not 
applying to prisoners triable by military tribunals, or under sentence for such tribunal.”150 This 
exception, granted only to prisoners triable by military tribunals, was significant because it left 
the executive without restraint in all areas where martial law is present. Given General Burnsides 
generous assertion that military rule extends over the entire North West north of the Ohio River 
because the Department of Ohio was one but large army camp, in affect, the entire Union, 
wherever soldiers are present, was subject to martial law. Because the Supreme Court held at this 
time an understanding any judgment against the military was outside its bounds, the military 
tribunals afforded the President “a certain security and legal sanction”151 to operate “with a 
certain assurance […] he had previously lacked. 
 In all, the President’s unchecked and unprecedented executive authority during the Civil 
War was predicated on the unique legal actions a civil war inherently precipitates, the curious 
commingling of both executive and legislative powers, and the establishment of military 
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tribunals, which the Supreme Court did not finally rule on their legality until after war. Randall 
finds through his study of the Constitutional problems under Lincoln that “the powers which the 
executive assumed and the prerogatives which he claimed were far reaching. They were fully 
adequate to the establishment of a dictatorship.”152His findings seem to agree with the despotic 
handling of the military tribunals described within this paper. In fact, “these trials were 
unconstitutional and could not have been validly authorized by Congress.”153 Clearly, the curious 
commingling of both legislative and executive powers granted Lincoln considerable, if not 
unlimited discretion in persecuting the war, as he deemed necessary. Finally, the indecision on 
behalf of the Supreme Court to not provide jurisprudence on these tribunals’ legal nature 
essentially placed all civil liberties arbitrarily within the scope of doctrine of necessity. As is 
evident from this paper’s considerations of both the Vallandigham and Milligan case, there 
existed no necessary grounds for arresting either dissenter. Instead, as has been previously 
discussed, their arrests were commuted solely for political expedience. The unbound powers 
vested within the executive during the Civil War, thus, provided a vacuum of oversight where 
the rights of the minority were disregarded and replaced with a system where one despot’s 





 While this study is firmly rooted in the past, its implications for safeguarding American 
civil liberties during times of crisis are still applicable today. Hopefully, this paper outlines just 
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how quickly the United States during times of crisis can morph from a democracy to a despot 
state, where minority rights can be quickly disregarded, and where those in power are simply left 
to their own devices. The American Civil War provided the President with unprecedented 
executive authority, and while this paper focuses on how this authority was misused, it can be 
argued this same authority ultimately won the war, and brought the country back together.  
 The Copperheads are an interesting group. All lumped together on the wrong side of 
history, this minority faction played a significant role during the course of the war, and, if not for 
some timely Union victories and military tribunals, looked primed to challenge Lincoln in the 
1864 presidential election. Copperheads came from all walks of life. Some were southern born 
Butternuts who were rural farmers in the North West who supported states rights. Others were 
Irish and German Catholic immigrants who feared emancipated blacks would take their jobs in 
the industrial north. All of them opposed the revolutions taking place behind the backdrop of the 
Civil War and the central government’s growing power. They decried the centralization of the 
federal government, which levied unprecedented drafts and income taxes against them, and 
joined secret societies to protect themselves against marauding Unionists. They were not all 
saints, though, and many of them were despicable and vile traitors during the war. However, 
Civil War historians like Jennifer Weber who give credence to this “fire in the rear” mythology 
often mischaracterize Copperheads. Allegations that these Copperheads resisted the draft were 
overblown, and reports of a North West Confederacy were fantastical. Many factors affected 
draft participation, and one of these factors, the bounty system, was a facet of the Conscription 
Act itself. The Copperheads get a bad rap, and deservedly so. They criticized their government it 
its moment of absolute peril, harbored virulent racist sentiments, and, in many cases, committed 




bad guys or not, this paper’s purpose is to determine whether the Lincoln Administration’s use of 
military tribunals to try civilians outside the zones of military conduct was necessary, or 
politically expedient.  
 As to whether the Copperheads like Vallandigham and Milligan posed a significant 
military threat, the answer is no. These secret societies they joined for mutual protection and 
social reasons were not paramilitary forces in any sense of the word. In gauging whether 
Vallandigham and Milligan posed a military threat, or even committed treason, treason’s history 
must be considered. Prior to the Civil War, an act was only deemed treasonous if one forcibly 
levied war against the United States, or forcibly aided, or provided comfort to an enemy. Finally, 
if anyone was charged with treason, there was only one adequate sentence: death. The Civil War 
and all of its complexities called for a watered down treason because, in an effort to restore the 
Union, what good would it do if everyone in the South, traitors all, had to be put to death? 
Treason’s change in definition and sentence was not designed with malicious intent in mind, but 
lowering the sentence’s severity also entailed lowering the standard of what actually constituted 
treasonable offenses. Now, Constructive Treason constituted treason, and uttering dissenting 
opinions could be met with a charge of counseling resistance. This was eventually the charge 
brought against Vallandigham after he denounced General Burnsides General Order 38.  
 With both Milligan and Vallandigham cleared of posing any military threat, it appears 
that their arrests both served political means. Vallandigham was a vocal critic of the war in 
Congress and Milligan was a prominent Democrat in Indiana. In analyzing the allegations 
against Copperhead secret societies, it is evident allegations of rampant resistance and riots were 
exaggerated by both the military and Republican press to paint Democrats in negative light. 




tribunals became an avenue for the Administration to silence critics and disregard their civil 
liberties. General Carrington’s letter to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton show this clear as day. 
The fact that the Knights of the Golden Circle only existed in Republican imaginations further 
proves Republicans and the Administration could veil overt acts of silencing dissent by labeling 
their political opponents traitors, trying them in military courts, and suspending their writs of 
habeas corpus. With almost all of these military judges and provost marshals being ardent 
Republicans, any citizen in the Country could be arbitrarily tried for criticizing the government. 
The accused had zero recourse to fight the sentence in an open court, which leads to my final 
paper’s final point: the military tribunals utilized in the prosecution of the American Civil War 
sets a bad precedent for the nation.  
 During the war, Lincoln wielded extensive power that extended beyond the powers 
bestowed upon the executive in the Constitution. At times he wielded both legislative and 
executive power because Congress passed an act that stated they would retroactively put into law 
and authorize any action Lincoln deemed necessary to persecuting the war. With the legislature 
unable to adequately check the President’s power because they were essentially complicit in any 
decision he made, only the Supreme Court had authority to curtail the President. With the war 
raging, the court took back seat, and claimed it did not have any authority over military courts, 
only the Commander in Chief did. So, in the vacuum of oversight, Lincoln stood alone to 
prosecute the war as he saw fit, and one despot’s definition of necessity can void the civil 
liberties of every American citizen.  
 To this day, the boundary of what is truly necessary during wartime is blurry. 
Considerable power is vested within the executive branch during times of crisis and war, and it is 




infringed upon. The question of what is truly necessary is still at play today—following the 
attack on 9/11 the U.S. government passed the PATRIOT Act, which gave the government 
unprecedented surveillance capabilities over its civilians. Even the current occupant of the White 
House, President Donald Trump, has called the border a national crisis that needs military action. 
During the Civil War, instead of the rule of law prevailing, men were tried and convicted outside 
the law and independent of the courts. Those, like Vallandigham and Milligan, whose rights had 
been so haphazardly stripped from them, suffered from a lack of justice while government 
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